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Current international involvement in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and
East Timor has two elements. The first is an "accountability" element,
consisting of various judicial and non-judicial processes. This element includes
the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the
proposed mixed international/local courts for "special crimes" in Kosovo, and
the mixed international/local process for prosecuting militia members for
serious crimes committed after the East Timorese referendum in 1999. The
second is a territorial administration element. Here, international actors assert
the right to exercise either plenary powers of administration-as with the United
Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and the United Nations Transitional
Authority in East Timor (UNTAET)-or certain governmental prerogatives
(e.g. the right to impose laws), as with the Office of the High Representative
(OHR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
In this paper, I suggest that the two elements of international involvement
-accountability and administration-have been conceived by international law
as mutually exclusive. That is to say, the accountability agenda has been set up
to address a particular area of activity, excluding the conduct of territorial
administration by international actors. I argue that such an exclusion has a
potentially negative impact within the territories affected. I set out the powers
asserted by and accountability regime directly applicable to international actors
in the sphere of territorial administration, and suggest the reasons for and the
effects of a lack of accountability in this sphere. In this regard, I look at
international law's regulatory structures insofar as these structures are directly
applicable tot he international actors involved. I am not concerned, therefore,
with how such structures might engage with the activity- of territorial
administration because this activity engages the legal personality of the host
territorial entity.'
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In each of the administration projects, international actors assert extensive
administrative powers. These powers are broad in terms of their subject-matter,
covering the whole spectrum of territorial administration. For example, under
Resolution 1272, the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor
is "endowed with overall responsibility for the administration of East Timor and
...
empowered to exercise all legislative and executive authority, including the
administration of justice."2 These powers are also wide in scope, being
explicitly conceived with minimal standards delineating how they are to be
exercised. Much of general international law-such as human rights and
environmental law-is clearly relevant to the conduct of territorial
administration. However, traditionally this law is conceived in terms of state
or (in the case of gross human rights abuses) individual responsibility.
In Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Kosovo, international actors have been
granted the usual privileges and immunities, undermining the capacity of
national law to regulate them directly for their conduct of administration.' In
East Timor, UNTAET considers itself immune from local jurisdiction, although
at the time of this writing, no legal instrument relating to such immunity has
been passed in local law. An Ombudsperson has been introduced belatedly in
Kosovo, and a similar institution is, at the time of this writing, at the proposal
stage in East Timor.4 The Kosovo Ombudsperson has the power to hear
complaints "concerning human fights violations and actions constituting an
abuse of authority" by UNMIK, but only has the power to make
recommendations as a result of these complaints.'
This attenuated local system of accountability is more than matched at the
international level, since none of the international judicial scrutiny mechanisms
can hear complaints brought against the international actors involved arising out
of their conduct of territorial administration. Looking at the International Court
of Justice (ICJ), scrutiny would only seem possible in the (somewhat unlikely)
event of the United Nations referring a case relating to its own activities for a
non-binding advisory opinion.' Beyond judicial mechanisms, there is, of
2.
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course, also the United Nations Security Council. However, in addition to the
usual problems that are raised by the idea of the Security Council as an effective
regulatory mechanism (its unrepresentative nature, the veto etc.), an additional
independence question is raised by the fact that this body played a formal role
in creating each of the administration projects to begin with.
A striking example of the combined inadequacy of domestic and
international scrutiny mechanisms directly applicable to international actors
when they carry out territorial administration would be the mandates of OHR
and the military Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Dayton grants both organizations "final authority" power "in theatre" (viz.
Bosnia and Herzegovina) to interpret their respective mandates.7 Since the
mandates exist as a matter of international law, the "in theatre" caveat suggests
that the final authority power does not render all interpretations made by OHR
and SFOR automatically lawful, but rather makes the legality of such
interpretations unchallengeable in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Taking this
domestic exclusion alongside the lack of international jurisdiction, it would
seem that, lawful or unlawful, all interpretations of these mandates by the
relevant international actors go unchallenged as far as the institutions of national
and international judicial scrutiny are concerned.8
Considering the above factors together, international actors engage in
administrative activity that is similar to (and, indeed, necessarily based on) the
activity performed by states in their own territory, yet no comparable regulatory
regime applies directly to them when they engage in such activity. Some of the
reasons for this lie in two broad areas: first, assumptions concerning the
behavior of states and international organizations, and second, the manner in
which territorial administration by international actors has emerged.
The way international law applies to international organizations and states
assumes that these two actors perform different activities. With territorial
administration, the assumption is that states perform this activity and
international organizations do not. This assumption explains who is involved
in regulating territorial administration, and in what role. States are regulated;
international organizations are not, and, moreover, act in a regulatory role (for
example, through monitoring human rights). The international regulatory
process reflects, and thereby reinforces, these distinct roles and the assumption
that lies behind them. Moreover, the assumption that states administer territory
and international actors do not is reflected in the way international law
influences the application of national law to these two actors. Whereas the law
7.
(OHR).

See Dayton Peace Agreement. supra note 3. Annex IA, art. XII (SFOR); Annex 10, art. V

8.
They may however, be challengeable not as the acts of international actors, but as the acts of
the state. See supra note 1.

458

ILSA Journalof International& ComparativeLaw [Vol. 7:455

is silent with respect to local governments (in their own state), as I have already
said it grants international actors immunity from national law. This immunity
reflects an idea that international organizations do not perform "local" activities
(such as administration), but rather, perform activities that are distinct and
somehow "above" the "local" (such as scrutinizing territorial administration by
states).
A further potential cause of the accountability deficit is the way the current
administration projects merged and were conceived. The projects developed in
an ad hoc manner, with different organizations involved (OHR in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, the United Nations in Kosovo and East Timor). Each project is
conceived as "temporary" and "interim," with the full conduct of territorial
administration by local actors the eventual goal. These two factors can undercut
arguments calling for accountability mechanisms applicable directly to
international actors when they engage in territorial administration-there is no
need to bother too much about accountability for something that will not last
and may not recur.
What effect does this accountability problem have on the activity itself and
those affected by it? One of the objectives in the current projects is to foster
conditions for a liberal-democratic order in the territory, rooted in human rights,
a vibrant civil society, the rule of law and an elected, representative government.
Whereas territorial administration by international actors seeks to promote these
conditions, paradoxically it operates in an autocratic manner itself-"benevolent
despotism," as Sergio Vierra de Mello, the head of the United Nations
administration in East Timor, puts it. 9 An aspect of this 'despotism' is, of
course, the lack of accountability. One danger is that territorial administration
by international actors may be undermining its own objectives, by establishing
a precedent for governance that is unaccountable, centralized and autocratic.
Moreover, the accountability deficit with respect to international actors
when they carry out administration creates further problems when considered
alongside other areas where accountability is promoted. This brings me back
to the accountability agenda I sketched at the start. One of the arguments made
for the International Criminal Court (ICC) was that justice is compromised
when it is selective. The presence of ad hoc tribunals with limited temporal and
territorial scope, in the absence of an ICC, effectively privileges accountability
with respect to a narrow geographical area and time period. Looking at the
issue of selectivity from a different angle, the existence of criminal tribunals
with certain subject-matter jurisdiction over individuals, in the absence of
accountability mechanisms applicable directly to international actors conducting
administration, may operate on a symbolic level to foster an idea that
9.
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accountability operates exclusively on the individual level, and only in respect
of the most serious acts. I shall discuss these two symbolic elements in turn.
First, the symbolism of focusing exclusively on individual accountability.
Of course, because of the role played by group identity in the 1991-95 conflict
in the former Yugoslavia, many found the focus on individual rather than
collective local accountability appealing. However, this consideration, whatever
its merits, is on its own terms inapplicable to collective responsibility as far as
international actors are concerned. Moreover, the above objective allied to the
conduct of administration by international actors-promoting a liberal
democratic order-is necessarily rooted in the idea of a collective polis. In
administration, therefore, the nettle of collective identity has been grasped
already, albeit in a confused fashion in the case of Kosovo, given the continuing
uncertainty as to that territory's eventual status. An exclusive focus on the
individual in the accountability sphere risks undermining the project of forging
a particular kind of collective identity in the political sphere.
Turning to the symbolism of focusing exclusively on serious crimes.
Again, the commission of these crimes is considered more important than other
forms of accountability, because of their serious nature. Such a consideration,
however, concerns relative importance: it does not itself suggest why other
forms of accountability should be almost totally absent. Moreover, in the long
term, an absence of other forms of accountability may operate on a
representational level to occlude the changes that happen in the society affected.
The prosecution of serious crimes symbolizes a deeply traumatized society.
Equally, the operation of other, less important accountability structures also
symbolizes a society where accountability issues are no longer as grave. As far
as Bosnia and Herzegovina is concerned, the vast majority, if not all
prosecutions at the ICTY concern acts that took place at least five years ago.
Whereas these prosecutions continue to symbolize the trauma of the Bosnian
people, certain other accountability mechanisms symbolizing how Bosnian
society has changed since 1995-such as mechanisms directly applicable to
international actors-are absent. Yet all can agree that, regardless of whether
anything else has changed significantly since Dayton, the kinds of acts that
come under ICTY jurisdiction no longer take place to anywhere near the same
degree.
Another representational problem with the current accountability bias is
that it risks creating a perception that accountability is for "us" the local people,
not "them" the international officials. Whereas some of the reasons for
territorial administration by international actors-for example, filling the
administrative vacuum after conflict-are understood, the reasons for
unaccountability on the part of international actors are not. This apparent
inconsistency creates the impression of arbitrariness, potentially making more
persuasive the idea that territorial administration by international actors is a
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paternalistic, imperialist endeavor. In turn, this idea threatens the project of
fostering conditions where a liberal-democratic political system can flourish, by
reinforcing perceptions that the project is about imposing an alien system rather
than supporting local political initiatives.
In conclusion, the international regulatory regime directly applicable to
international actors when they carry out administration needs to be transformed.
This requires changes in the law and legal enforcement modalities. Territorial
administration by international actors is a significant institution of international
policy that profoundly affects the lives of people in Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Kosovo and East Timor, and may be utilized in other situations in the future.
The ad hoc criminal tribunals were followed by the joined-up thinking on
international criminal justice effected through the institution of the ICC. What
is also needed, in the light of the ad hoc administrative projects, is joined-up
analysis on the way international actors can be made more directly accountable
for their conduct of territorial administration.

